Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis

Abstract: Despite significant investment in anticorruption instruments in the past decades, confusion about their effectiveness remains. While a growing body of scholarship claims that anticorruption reforms have generally failed, other scholars have shown that particular anticorruption tools may actually work. A likely explanation for these puzzling outcomes is that public administration research holds a mistaken view of corruption, and improperly selected anticorruption strategies often target the wrong type of corruption. To overcome this problem, this article proposes a four-cell typology of corruption, reflecting two critical dimensions along which most corrupt behaviors occur: the resource transfer and the primary beneficiary. Synthesizing recent research developments, this article introduces a new conceptualization of corruption that integrates perspectives from several disciplines. It also offers a series of propositions concerning how each corruption type could be fought. The article concludes with implications for research and practice.

Evidence for Practice

• Anticorruption policies should be supported by clearer corruption concepts.
• Reflecting on resource transfer and primary beneficiary can help address the conceptual confusion surrounding corruption.
• A new typology-based conceptualization of corruption explains a wide range of corrupt activities and the possible impacts of anticorruption policies on them.
• Tailor the anticorruption strategy to specific types of corruption.

Despite the considerable amount of resources invested in anticorruption policies, the track record of such measures is perplexing. On the one hand, a growing body of scholarship claims that most anticorruption reforms have failed (Bauhr 2017; Heywood 2017; Ledeneva, Bratu, and Köper 2017, 7; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015; Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013). On the other hand, several studies report that anticorruption tools do reduce corruption (Arman-tier and Boly 2011; Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2003; Olken 2005). What is the reason for such ambiguity? This article argues that the problem is poor alignment between actual forms of corruption and policy responses. The existing public administration research holds a poorly conceptualized view of corruption; therefore, anticorruption efforts often fail. To fix this, a typology of different types of corruption is offered, and propositions are formulated concerning how each of them could be curbed. This typology-based conceptualization integrates new perspectives from other disciplines into public administration.

While the impacts of some anticorruption policies, especially formal top-down measures such as rewards, penalties, monitoring, and regulations, have been studied extensively, the effectiveness of bottom-up tools, such as whistle-blowing, staff morale, or community monitoring, has attracted little attention from empirical researchers (Gans-Morse et al. 2018). Macro-level cross-sectional studies conclude that rewards, specifically higher government wages, have limited or no contribution to lowering levels of corruption (Alt and Lassen 2014; Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2012; Treisman 2000). Moreover, the presence of a dedicated anticorruption agency in a country has no significant effect on the control of corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015, 106–9). In contrast to the common argument that strong legal systems are key anticorruption components, cross-country models suggest the opposite: corruption undermines the rule of law, which, in turn, increases corruption and reduces the probability of being detected and punished (Herzfelda and Weiss 2003). Surprisingly, many nations that demonstrate a higher rate of corruption are even more likely to have in place robust and strict anticorruption regulations (Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov 2017).
Case studies of particular countries or regions also claim that corruption can thrive despite the existence of fairly comprehensive anticorruption policies. For example, in the late 1990s, Thailand introduced multiple anticorruption reforms and good governance mechanisms, yet the level of corruption has remained high (Mutebi 2008). In Malaysia, in spite of strong governmental campaigns and a variety of policy initiatives, corruption has continued to be acute and pervasive (Kapeli and Mohamed 2015; Siddiquee 2010). Central and Eastern European member states of the European Union also introduced a large number of anticorruption measures during the 1990s and 2000s, but corruption has remained rampant in those countries (Batory 2012). An assessment of World Bank’s efforts to reduce corruption in 19 countries in the period between 1999 and 2006 concludes that “the Bank’s clear successes in corruption reduction have been much fewer than the failures” (Fjeldstad and Isaksen 2008, 62).

Yet other empirical studies, evaluating the performance of anticorruption tools against actual corrupt schemes at the micro level, provide a different view. For example, external government monitoring has deterred kickback-type corruption in village road projects in Indonesia (Olken 2005). Another article reaches a similar conclusion: intense government monitoring has made it less likely that procurement officers in public hospitals in the city of Buenos Aires accept bribes from supplier firms (Di Tella and Schargodsky 2003). Moreover, external audits of municipal governments before elections in Puerto Rico have induced at least a short-term reduction in corruption (Bobonis, Cámara-Fuertes, and Schwabe 2016). A similar study of Brazil’s anticorruption program, which randomly audited municipalities for their use of federal funds, found that being audited in the past reduces future corruption by 8 percent (Avis, Ferraz, and Finan 2016). Internal monitoring and punishment have also lowered bribe acceptance among part-time graders who were offered cash bribe in return for giving better grades on high school exam papers (Armanitier and Boly 2011). Additionally, the effective role of penalties against rule breaking has been confirmed by a natural experiment in which after the city of New York abolished United Nations diplomats’ privilege to avoid paying parking tickets and started removing the official diplomatic license plates from vehicles that had accumulated unpaid tickets, violations decreased significantly (Fisman and Miguel 2007).

Although the latter findings suggest that anticorruption can be effective, especially if it is tailored to respond to particular types of corruption, the public administration literature has made little effort to explore such corruption types. This article argues that if we specify exactly what we understand about different types of corruption, it may be possible to develop more effective anticorruption strategies. How can we construct a clear, parsimonious typology of corruption? Earlier corruption classification schemes are not very helpful because they are unidimensional, focusing on only one aspect of the phenomenon. Moreover, most contemporary public administration studies lack conceptual clarity and view corruption as a “general thing” without referring to any specific form of the phenomenon. Although other disciplines have revealed important features and various forms of corruption, their findings have never been integrated into the public administration literature.

This article contributes to the literature in two ways. First, using two dimensions—the mechanism for transferring resources and the primary beneficiary of the corrupt act—recent research developments are synthesized, and a typology of corruption is created that explains a wide variety of corrupt activities. Second, based on this typology, the possible impacts of anticorruption frameworks on different types of corruption are discussed. This helps improve the alignment between actual forms of corruption and policy responses.

The article proceeds as follows. The following section discusses what classification schemes of corruption were developed previously. Second, the main corruption theories are reviewed, and an examination of how corruption is actually conceptualized and measured in the contemporary public administration literature is presented. Then, the analytical approach to developing the corruption typology and a systematic classification of the main anticorruption tools are presented. The next section presents each corruption type and a series of propositions concerning how they could be combated. The final section offers some implications for research and practice.

**Existing Classifications of Corruption**

Typologies are a form of classification, but they are generally conceptual and multidimensional (Bailey 1994). The term “conceptual” emphasizes the nonempirical nature of typologies, while the term “multidimensional” emphasizes capturing multiple dimensions by cross-tabulating two or more variables (Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright 2012). However, most attempts to distinguish different forms of corruption are not real typologies but unidimensional classifications organized around a single variable. Many of them are even dichotomous, dividing corruption into just two categories.

**Locations of Corruption**

Several classification schemes locate corruption at different levels of the government system. A commonly used distinction of this kind is between petty and grand corruption. In petty corruption, ordinary citizens bribe low-level public officials with small sums of money, while grand corruption involves big money and actors from the top of corporate and political hierarchies (Rose-Ackerman 1999). Another classification scheme distinguishes between bureaucratic and political corruption: corruption in the public administration, related to the implementation of policies, versus corruption that involves political decision makers (Amundsen 1997). Some scholars differentiate between corruption at the local and central government levels (Beer and Navot 2013). Corruption can be also classified based on its location within functionally defined government institutions or activates such as police, border control, judiciary, education, defense, building inspection, land acquisition, or infrastructure construction (Gupta 2017; Morris 2011).

**Forms of Corruption**

Another way to classify corruption is to catalog its major forms (Zhang and Vargas-Hernández 2015). Accordingly, a distinction can be made between *bribery*, or acts of giving financial benefits to the public official in power in exchange for favorable treatment or services; *extortion*, or situations in which a public officials take money from a private party by means of illegal compulsion;
kickbacks, or commissions paid to a public official as a reward for rendering government contracts to the bribe payer; and three similar forms, *patronage, nepotism,* and *cronyism,* rewarding political supporters, relatives, or exclusive social network members with government employment. A more advanced classification system discusses categories of corruption on several individual variables such as forms (bribery, extortion, etc.), activities (appointing personnel, buying things, etc.), sectors (construction, health, energy, etc.) and places (countries, regions, localities, etc.) (Graycar 2015). Yet this study does not combine such variables. Another interesting classification, based on the normative evaluation of corruption by elites and mass population, distinguishes between “black,” “gray,” and “white” forms of corruption (Heidenheimer 1993). Black corruption is condemned by both elites and ordinary people. In the case of gray corruption, some social groups, usually elites, want to see the action punished, while the mainstream population is more ambiguous. White corruption is tolerable by the entire society.

**Actors and Resources: A Multidimensional Typology**

Jennifer Bussell’s (2015) more elaborated multidimensional typology is organized around two variables that consider the types of state resources as well as the actors at different levels of government who have control over those resources. Using these two variables, the author distinguishes four types of corruption: (1) *legislative corruption,* when presidents/prime ministers, legislators, and top bureaucrats control government policies and legislations; (2) *contracting,* when middle-level bureaucrats control the allocation of licenses and contracts; (3) *employment,* when politicians and bureaucrats control the allocation of public sector jobs; (4) and *services,* when “street-level” bureaucrats directly control the provision of goods and services to citizens. Bussell argues that this typology provides a guideline for thinking about which actors are relevant to different forms of corruption.

The classification schemes discussed in this section reveal important aspects of corruption, but most of them remain unidimensional and fail to handle the complexity of corrupt activities. By incorporating several of them, this article offers broader dimensions to capture the many types of corruption in order to achieve greater parsimony and integration.

**Theories of Corruption**

In his seminal article, Gjalt de Graaf (2007) presents six kinds of literature to theorize corruption. This work is not a typology of corruption but rather a typology of corruption theories. I have added a seventh theory based on the most recent theoretical developments. Although these literatures represent stand-alone theoretical perspectives of corruption, some of them are especially helpful to theorize particular components of corrupt transactions in the typology presented here.

The public choice theory literature focuses only on the individual-level decisions of a corrupt public official who wants to maximize his or her private profit. The very reason public officials are corrupt is that after a rational means-end calculation, they perceive that the potential benefits (illegal profit) of being corrupt exceed the potential costs (chances of being caught), so they participate in it (Rose-Ackerman 1978).

Similarly to public choice theory, bad apple theories explain corruption at the individual level, yet here the cause of the agent’s corrupt behavior is not the result of rational calculation, as the public choice theory claims, but the lack of moral character that normally holds people back from breaking the law. Bad apple theories view corruption as an exceptional problem, a temporary pathology created by a few bad apples in an otherwise healthy public agency.

Organizational culture theories emphasize meso-level organizational factors as the main causes of corruption. They view corruption as a group behavior located in the structure and culture of the organization within which public agents are working. Here the corrupt group culture leads to a certain mental state determining the corrupt behavior of the individual.

Clashing moral values theories explain corruption with societal-level values and norms that directly influence the values and norms of an individual. There is an antagonism between particularistic values related to the agent’s informal social network and more universal values related to his or her official role. Here moral personal duties to friends and family overrule the agent’s obligations as a public officer.

The fifth type of literature, ethos of public administration theories, focuses on the impact of macro-level political and economic factors on public organizations. According to this literature, large-scale public sector reforms influenced by the New Public Management approach have significant negative effects on the culture within public management. Deregulation, privatization, corporate-style management, and a shift toward a market ethos increase the level of corruption by neglecting and undermining the traditional ethos of public administration such as integrity, merit, accountability, responsibility, and longevity of service.

Correlation theories are mainly a collection of popular research papers rather than a real theory. The authors of these papers use quantitative, comparative—often cross-county—analysis to identify macro-level factors such as income, democracy, economic development, urbanization, education, voter turnout, or size of the public sector that correlate with overall corruption. As a proxy measure of corruption, these studies use expert panels, corruption perception indices, or other aggregate indicators.

A seventh corruption theory can be added to the six theories discussed by de Graaf (2007). There is a growing body of scholarship that conceptualizes corruption as a collective action problem (Bauhr 2017; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015; Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013; Rothstein and Varrainc 2017). According to this theory, corruption persists because the public agent perceives that all other agents are likely to be corrupt. In a society in which corruption is the expected behavior, there will be no actors with incentives to enforce punishment regimes, and therefore no one will be held accountable for the corrupt act. Here—similar to public choice theory—corruption is explained by the individual official’s rational means-end calculation. When corruption is “free riding,” the most rational and profitable choice for the agent is to participate in it.
Conceptualizing and Measuring Corruption in the Public Administration Literature

Does contemporary public administration literature actually use the theories of corruption discussed in the previous section? Are multiple forms of corruption considered in this literature? In order to answer these questions, articles on corruption published in top-ranking public administration journals over the last 10 years were reviewed. These articles were identified as follows: first, a search was conducted of the online archives of journals ranked within the top 10 in public administration by ISI Journal Citation Reports in 2017 for all articles published between January 2008 and September 2018 that had “corruption” in their titles or abstracts. Second, articles that did not focus primarily on corruption were excluded. Finally, 46 articles were selected. The journals and the number of articles on corruption identified in each are listed in table 1.

The majority of the selected articles (33) were quantitative empirical studies. Seven qualitative studies (three interviews, three case studies, and one text analysis), two mixed-methods studies, and four theoretical articles were identified. Among the 33 quantitative articles, 19 were based on cross-country, five national, and five public agency-level analysis. To measure corruption, they typically used composite indices (Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index or the World Bank’s Control of Corruption) or questions about the perceived overall level of corruption or the perceived level of corruption in particular public organizations such as political parties, government, parliament, the military, or the police. Four of the 33 quantitative articles used official statistics, such as the number of prosecuted cases or the number of convictions, as indicators of corruption.

A lack of conceptual clarity was discovered in many of selected articles. In 17 of the 33 quantitative studies, the authors conceptualized corruption as a “general thing” without referring to any specific form of the phenomenon. These articles attempted to explain the variation of the overall level of corruption with different factors. These studies are classified as following the correlation theories framework.

Of the 46 selected studies, eight clearly conceptualized corruption as a collective action problem. Six of these eight were quantitative articles using survey items or composite indices to measure corruption, one was a theoretical article, and another one was a qualitative study based on interviews. Five studies conceptualized corruption at the individual level in a manner consistent with the public choice theory, which occurs when a public agent uses rational decision making to decide to accept a bribe from a private firm, yet these articles used macro-level composite indices to measure such acts.

Although not explicitly discussed, one article embraced the organizational culture perspective by studying the role of female police officers in reducing corruption in a male-dominated macho organizational environment. Moreover, another article, also vaguely, referred to the clashing moral values theory by measuring corruption with the item “corruption is tolerable if it was committed by a friend or relative.” Because of conceptual ambiguity, I was not able to identify any other theories in the remaining articles.

Only six articles of the 46 selected articles depicted corruption as a multifaceted phenomenon and considered more than one type in their analysis. Three of them used an inductive analytical approach and identified corruption categories derived from qualitative empirical data, such as interviews, case studies, and prosecuted corruption cases (de Graaf and Huberts 2008; Graycar and Villa 2011; Jancsics and Javor 2012). The remaining three studies used survey items to measure different types of corruption (Bauhr 2017; Bussell 2018; Su and Ni 2018).

In summary, the most typical way to view corruption in the public administration literature is the correlation theories approach. These studies try to identify correlated factors across countries, states, or regions, but they lack a clear concept of corruption. This literature review echoes de Graaf’s (2007) concern about the unclear causal link between abstract proxy variables and the actual corrupt act within this approach. Moreover, a vast majority of contemporary research in public administration ignores variation in corruption, analyzing it either as a general abstract thing or considering only one example of corrupt behavior. Based on this understanding of the literature, a more elaborate way to conceptualize and classify corruption is called for.

Methodology

The analytical approach to developing the typology was based on qualitative thematic analysis techniques (Miles, Huberman, and Saldana 2014), in which initial categories were developed from the interdisciplinary corruption literature and refined until the new construct captured the complexity of corrupt activities but, at the same time, was simple enough to preserve its heuristic power. The analysis comprised the following stages:

1. **Identification of relevant corruption literature:** This included key academic articles, books, and book chapters on corruption from eminent scholars in each social science discipline, such as public administration, economics, management science, criminology, sociology, social anthropology, political science, and political economy.
The sample was not prespecified but evolved during the review process. Moreover, this literature was not selected in a systematic fashion but rather in the manner of nonlinear iterative approach by using purposive sampling (Finfgeld-Connett and Johnson 2013). The initial choices were identified through the review process of Matthew C. Stephenson’s (2018) bibliography on corruption and anticorruption, through discussions with experts, and through background knowledge on the topic. Additional literature was identified from reference lists of the reviewed publications. Some criteria, typically used in general social theory, were used to retain literature in the analysis. The literature source had to address one of the following attributes of corruption: the function of corruption, the social mechanisms coordinating the corrupt actors’ behavior, the form of corruptly exchanged resources, the nature of the relationship between the actors, and their motivation.

2. Iterative process of comparing similarities and differences among corruption concepts in the literature: At this stage of the analysis, it was clear that the mechanisms for transferring resources from one corrupt party to another indicated different organizational and social arrangements and explained qualitatively different types and functions of corrupt transactions. The classic work of the economic anthropologist Karl Polanyi (2001, 49–52) on resource transfer offers a general framework for the analysis. According to Polanyi, in human history there have been three main ways to transfer goods between social actors: market exchange, reciprocity, and redistribution. Polanyi’s categories were applied to the issue of corrupt transactions. Different types of actors can participate in corruption for their individual or social group benefit, or the primary beneficiary can be a formal organization. Different beneficiaries also indicate qualitatively unique types of corruption.

3. Refinement of the main dimensions: Here, two main dimensions—the mechanism for transferring resources and the primary beneficiary of the corrupt act—emerged as the basis for synthesizing corruption research. Based on the variation within categories of these two dimensions, corruption can manifest itself through four distinct types that cover a wide range of corrupt activities: market corruption, social bribe, corrupt organizations, and state capture. These types and their main attributes along each dimension (resource transfer and primary beneficiary) are summarized in table 2. Each type represents a unique form of corruption. The types also differ from each other based on several attributes such as the form of exchanged resources, the relationship between the actors and their motivation, the function of corruption, and the mechanisms coordinating the actors’ behavior. Although elements of these four types have been individually discussed in the literature, they have never been integrated into parsimonious typology of corruption.

4. Development of working definitions of corruption: The conceptualization of corruption in this article is informed by the theoretical lens that considers corruption as a resource transfer between different types of actors. Therefore, a working definition of corruption is embedded in the typology: corruption is a complex social activity in which money, goods, or other resources that belong to a public organization are exchanged or transferred covertly in a way that benefits particularistic actors instead of the organization or the general public. Other white-collar criminal activities are excluded from this analysis, such as fraud, embezzlement, theft, insider trading, submission of false claims, or tax evasion, because they can be conducted by only one person without the necessity of resource transfer between partners.

5. Application of the typology: At this stage, examples from different countries were added to the theory-based intangible subcomponents in order make it easier to apply the typology to practice. Moreover, using a basic classification of anticorruption strategies, propositions were formulated concerning how each type of corruption can or cannot be combated.

**Limitations**

Conceptual typologies are heuristic devices to support our understanding of complex social life by capturing some essential features of the studied phenomenon. However, as theoretical abstractions, they are inevitably based on the subjective perspective of the scholars who choose the lenses through which the issue is reviewed. This study views corruption as a form of resource transfer. While this is an important dimension, other aspects such as legal, financial, or psychological dimensions, which are not included in this analysis, can be also vital to explain corruption.

Moreover, although conceptual typologies are encompassing because they can cover all categories that are theoretically relevant (Busetto, Luijkx, and Vrijhoef 2017), they represent organizational forms that, in their pure form, may not exist in reality (Bailey 1994, 15). A more advanced theory of corruption and anticorruption needs to be tested by rigorous empirical research. Here, the main goal should be to measure the deviation between real-life corruption and elements of this conceptual typology.

Finally, approaches to corruption are continually developing, and this typology should be flexible enough to allow for new components to be added. An extensive review of the existing literature on corruption was conducted, but the purposive sampling was not comprehensive, and hence some important articles may have been missed. Moreover, new key categories of corruption will eventually emerge, requiring a revision of the typology. Despite these limitations, this typology can be a strong basis for future corruption research.

**Anticorruption Classifications**

This section provides a basic classification of anticorruption strategies, and later in the article, the ways in which the different anticorruption

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**Table 2** Main Types of Corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Corruption</th>
<th>Form of Transfer</th>
<th>Primary Beneficiary</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market corruption</td>
<td>Market exchange</td>
<td>Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social bribe</td>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>Individual/group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrupt organizations</td>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State capture</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Individual/group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5
Noncorrupt organizational culture and whistle-blowing, referring to employees who expose corrupt activities within their own organization (Taylor 2018). The typical internal bottom-up instruments are staff morale or corporate realm. These instruments are often transmitted through social/cultural control channels such as beliefs, values, norms, or legislative bodies. These strategies are transmitted through administrative control channels with the primary function of preventing, discouraging, and sanctioning deviant social behavior (Lange 2008). In contrast to top-down instruments, bottom-up anticorruption is a more grassroots-type phenomenon, initiated by intrinsically motivated actors such as individuals, local communities, or civil society members who are outside the formal governmental or corporate realm. These instruments are often transmitted through social/cultural control channels such as beliefs, values, norms, social pressure, or mobilization (Lange 2008). The internal/external dimension simply describes whether anticorruption happens within the focal organization or is implemented by external actors.

**Top-Down Anticorruption**

Examples of internal top-down policies include meritocratic recruitment and promotion, background checks or polygraph testing (in law enforcement), monitoring the activity of employees and their use of organizational resources, establishing documentation requirements, threat of penalties (e.g., financial penalty, dismissal, or legal action), rewards (e.g., higher salaries), a code of ethics outlining the standards to which the employee is held, staff rotation that regularly changes the person in charge of vulnerable positions in order to prevent long-term relationships with corrupt clients, and formal training to teach employees how to successfully identify possible corrupt situations. External top-down practices include anticorruption regulations, law enforcement authorities, and independent judiciary who sanction corruption. Other external top-down practices are government monitoring of organizational operations, anticorruption agencies specialized in fighting corruption beyond the domestic level, and legally binding international anticorruption treaties.

**Bottom-Up Anticorruption**

The typical internal bottom-up instruments are staff morale or noncorrupt organizational culture and whistle-blowing, referring to employees who expose corrupt activities within their own organization (Taylor 2018). The typical external bottom-up instruments are staff morale or corporate realm. These instruments are often transmitted through social/cultural control channels such as beliefs, values, norms, social pressure, or mobilization (Lange 2008). The internal/external dimension simply describes whether anticorruption happens within the focal organization or is implemented by external actors.

**Table 3 Anticorruption Strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top-down</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment and promotion</td>
<td>Regulations</td>
<td>Law enforcement and judiciary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal monitoring (compliance)</td>
<td>Law enforcement and judiciary</td>
<td>External monitoring (audit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penalties and rewards</td>
<td>External monitoring (audit)</td>
<td>Anticorruption agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code of ethics</td>
<td>Anticorruption agencies</td>
<td>International conventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limiting discretion (rotation)</td>
<td>International conventions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up</td>
<td>Whistle-blowing</td>
<td>Citizen/community monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational culture</td>
<td>Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil society</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nongovernmental organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Market exchange, based on a transfer and an immediate countertransfer, is an impersonal act (Polanyi 2001, 49–52). It is a pure commodity-type exchange between partners who are not socially bonded (Gregory 1982, 42). Here the counter usually comes in a material form, mainly cash, without delay (Sahlins 1965, 148). In market exchange, the “price” captures all relevant information and coordinates the transaction (Powell 1990). The corrupt form of market exchange can be described as market corruption: a quid pro quo between only two individuals (not organizations), an agent who illegally “sells” or misuses his or her organization’s resources over which he or she has discretion and an outsider client who pays for them. The primary function of this corruption is instrumental because both actors, who will not meet in the future, opt for corruption because the calculated instant benefits exceed the costs and risks associated with the illegal exchange (Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1975; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). These partners behave exactly as public choice theory’s rationally calculating actors (de Graaf 2007).

Market corruption is typically petty corruption, bribing low-level agents “on the spot” where actors meet (Jancsics 2013). This cell in the typology is similar to Bussell’s (2015) service corruption category, in which street-level bureaucrats directly control the provision of goods and services to citizens. Bribing traffic police to overlook speeding or customs officers to turn a blind eye to petty smuggling, expired passports, or overstay in a country are among the most typical examples of market corruption. In several West African countries, it is a standard practice that police, gendarmerie, or customs officers demand “coffee” or “beer money” from the drivers at each checkpoint along roads in return for letting them go (Blundo and de Sardan 2006, 196).

While some internal top-down policies are effective against market corruption, others are not. Agents in market corruption work in close proximity to the physical or abstract boundaries of organizations (e.g., night shifts, streets, entry ports, remote land borders), frequently meet many outsider clients, and have considerable discretion in making decisions that influence the client. They have more opportunities for corruption because such “authority leakage” or “low managerial visibility” makes it difficult or costly to monitor them by distant upper-level organizational units (Newburn 1999; Tullock 1965).

**Proposition 1:** In the case of market corruption, monitoring is a less effective internal top-down strategy to detect corruption.
Market corruption steals or misuses the public organization’s resources and undermines its formal goals. Therefore, it is in the organization’s clear interest to detect corrupt agents. Since one of the most powerful drivers of market corruption is the actor’s rational calculation, maximizing the costs of corruption and minimizing the benefits are effective anticorruption tools. The benefits of corruption are much harder to influence; therefore, increasing the costs by using disciplinary procedures and enforced sanctions is the best strategy (de Graaf 2007; Trevino et al. 1999). For example, punitive control policies to detect and punish corrupt police officers are often successful (Newburn 1999; Sherman 1978, 146).

**Proposition 2:** In the case of market corruption, imposed penalties that are internal top-down strategies make corrupt behavior less attractive to the agents.

External top-down strategies can also pose serious threat to corrupt public officials. Intelligence practices such as wiretaps, body microphones, or faked situations are especially well suited against market corruption (Newburn 1999). Since the corrupt officer has to take the risk to make a deal with an unknown client, undercover agents from other government agencies can relatively easily play the role of a bribe giver and expose corruption. For example, a large-scale undercover operation reduced corruption significantly within New York City Police Department (Henry 1990). Many border corruption cases in the United States are also detected and investigated by external agencies (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Agency) by faking corrupt situations (Homeland Security Advisory Council 2005).

**Proposition 3:** In the case of market corruption, intelligence practices conducted by government agencies as external top-down measures are effective for detecting corruption.

The agent’s main motivation for participating in market corruption is to collect illegal material profit. Clients engage in it either to receive special illegal advantages—*greed*—or to receive fair treatment—*need* (Bauhr 2017). In the case of need corruption, the client engages in the illegal act because this is the only way he or she can receive services or avoid abuses. Here the agent extorts money for service that would be otherwise free, demands extra money beyond official fees, or falsifies records of an event and demands money for not distorting true information. Greed corruption is basically collusion in which both parties are eager to participate, while need corruption includes clear extortive elements from the agent side. Typical examples of need corruption include border protection officers intentionally slowing down border traffic and speeding it up only if clients pay bribes, or policemen demanding bribes for made-up offenses. In many countries, need corruption is also widespread in the health sector (Graycar and Prenzer 2013, 116). For example, despite the fact that public health care is free in Tanzania, patients report that “without bribing the nurses then one will be treated like trash” (Camargo and Sambaiga 2016, 218).

Some external bottom-up strategies might be very effective against need corruption. Forcing clients to get involved in an exchange despite of their will may trigger disproval and protest against extorters and a willingness to report corrupt agents by the outside actor. Consequently, external whistle-blowing has proved to be an effective tool against need corruption (Apaza and Chang 2011). Victims have a strong incentive to expose the extortive behavior of public officials to journalists, and a free press can provide a platform for voicing complaints (Brunetti and Weder 2003; Coronel 2008). Moreover, ordinary citizens are often more interested in lower-level than higher-level corruption, as this is closer to their everyday experience, and extortion scandals receive significant public attention (Rao 2013, 129). For example, more than 100 newspapers and 10 television stations covered a corruption case in China involving abusive low-level police officers, and the story eventually become a national scandal (Jeffreys 2010).

**Proposition 4:** In the case of “need” market corruption, a free press and external whistle-blowing by citizens can be highly effective mechanisms of external bottom-up anticorruption.

Although public choice theory is a suitable framework for theorizing the agent-client relationship in market corruption, organizational culture theories might have more explanatory power for understanding what is happening on the officer’s side in the public organization (de Graaf 2007). In market corruption situations, the “organization of corruption individuals” phenomenon often emerges when a large number of employees organize themselves into collusive groups to extort payoffs from clients (Pinto, Leana, and Pil 2008; Rose-Ackerman 1999, 51). Such corruption spreads at higher rates in organizations with tall hierarchical structures, such as law enforcement agencies (Nekovee and Pinto 2017). Because of strong peer group solidarity in these organizations, the highly integrated rank-and-file workforce often develops a corrupt subculture, forcing members to get involved in corruption or at least remain silent about it (Gino and Galinsky 2012). For example, inspectors in South Africa who do not take bribes are often threatened directly by other colleagues (Sundström 2016). The most well known of these subcultures is the “blue shield” or “blue code of silence” among police officers, which forbids reporting a group member’s misconduct (Punch 2000; Sherman, 1978, 47; Westmarland 2005).

**Proposition 5:** In the case of market corruption in organizations with highly integrated workforces, internal whistle-blowing, a bottom-up strategy, is viewed as betrayal and sanctioned by the corrupt group.

**Social Bribe**

According to Polanyi (2001, 49–52), both market exchange and reciprocity are based on quid pro quo, but while market exchange is a resource transfer between two strangers, reciprocity indicates a preexisting and often complex social relationship structure involving multiple actors. Reciprocity is a gift-type exchange that creates a counterobligation, but the expectation of reciprocity is indefinite (Sahlins 1965, 147). Since partners trust each other and immediate material benefit is not a primary goal of the transfer, the return can be separated in time. The important social function of gift-type exchanges is to maintain the stability of social systems, keep social groups together, and integrate new group members (Gouldner 1960). Not only the immediate partners but also the whole social group may benefit from these transactions. Reciprocity is coordinated by network mechanisms in which informal norms of the “clan” facilitate members’ activities (Ouchi 1980). The corrupt
form of reciprocity is social bribe, a corrupt reciprocal exchange between two or more actors based on certain level of trust (Graycar and Jancsics 2016; Shore and Heller 2005, 16–17). Here a corrupt agent and the client, who are socially bounded, informally exchange resources, but the gift or countergift does not come from the agent’s own pocket but from the public organization where he or she is employed. For example, disregarding organizational policy, an official in a passport agency might expedite the passport-issuing process for a family member who reciprocates the favor with a lavish Sunday dinner. Yet the value of the exchanged organizational resource in social bribe might also be much higher, including well-paid public jobs, government-guaranteed loans, or long-term cheap concessions for government property.

Since activities such as searching for corrupt partners, gathering information on potential partners’ trustworthiness, negotiating illegal agreements, and enforcing the “bribe contract” are extremely risky, transaction costs are significantly higher in corrupt exchanges compared with legal economic exchanges (Della Porta and Vannucci 2004; Lambsdorff and Teksoz 2004). These costs can be reduced by social bribe. One of the main functions of social bonds in every society is to build trust, reduce uncertainty, and risk and provide stability in social life (Boissevain 1993, 313). Therefore, corrupt actors intuitively seek the opportunity to do trust-based social bribe instead of risky impersonal market corruption (Graeff 2005). Moreover, the delayed countertransfer and the immaterial form of the exchanged resource blur the corrupt nature of the deal and make corruption more undetectable (Lawler and Hipp 2010).

The case of the German police officer who shared information about impending police raids with a brothel manager with whom he had developed a close personal relationship is a good example of social bribe when immaterial resources are exchanged (Lambsdorff 2007, 218–19). The officer also received sexual service in return for the information. Empirical research suggests that social bribe is a complex social phenomenon including sequences of illegal, informal, and socially legitimate transactions, often facilitated by multiple corruption brokers (Blundo and de Sardan 2006, 98; Bussell 2018; Jancsics 2013).

Trust increases with repeated interactions (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995), and long-term corrupt partners can consciously and gradually develop social ties with various strength. For example, local smugglers in Central America often cultivate friendships with border officials and meet with them on a regular basis to have drinks and arrange bribes at the same time (Galemba 2012). However, the safest and more immediate solution to reduce the risks related to corruption is using already existing social networks (family, friendship, former school or workplace arrangements) as a given infrastructure for illicit transactions.

Although partners obviously gain material benefits from social bribe, an important element of their motivation is to fulfill social obligations. Clashing moral values theories, discussed by de Graaf (2007), are especially applicable in social bribe cases. Here the agent and the client are members of the same social network outside the organization and subject to the same informal normative system. Top-down policies are based on codified arrangements, but in social bribe, formal and informal rule systems clash, and formal institutions can be rendered illegitimate and subject to deceit (Polese, Kovacs, and Jancsics 2018; Schweitzer 2004). People who do not follow the informal norms face sanctions from their own group. For example, public officials in West Africa have reported strong social pressure from family, friends, and even neighbors to exchange favors at the cost of their public organization (Blundo and de Sardan 2006, 115–16). When they reject such “help,” they jeopardize their popular status within the social group but sometimes face more serious social costs, exclusion, or even physical violence from network members (Sundström 2016). External top-down measures are not just ineffective here but may even increase the level of social bribe. Empirical research suggests that giving jobs to family members in village roadway projects was a response to the increased external audit and a substitute for other forms of corruption (Olken 2005).

**Proposition 6:** In the case of social bribe between closely connected partners, strong informal norms extinguish internal and external top-down rule-based policies.

Although in social bribe, informal norms often override formal rules, the degree of social closeness and level of trust between corrupt partners vary case by case. It is possible that the agent and the client develop some level of trust, but they do not belong to the same informal network and are not subject to the same informal normative system. In such cases, asymmetric punishment, prosecuting, and punishing only the public official and imposing no legal liability for the client may further undermine the already unstable trusting relationship between the partners (Lambsdorff and Nell 2007; Rose-Ackerman 1999, 53). This provides incentives for the client to report the crime and thereby stop colluding (Abbink et al. 2014).

**Proposition 7:** In the case of social bribe between partners who are connected only by weak social ties, asymmetric (top-down) penalties, imposed by internal or external authorities, increase the chance of (self-) reporting.

In many social bribe cases, the corrupt agent is simultaneously a member of two qualitatively different social groups, an outside social network (family, friends, etc.) to whom he or she channels organizational resources and an organizational network of coworkers who may be aware of his or her corrupt practices. The two groups often have contradictory informal norm systems requiring conflicting identity patterns from the agent. In such a structural arrangement, colleagues can easily develop a belief (correctly or incorrectly) that the agent is not “one of us,” since he or she appears to conform to the external group’s value system instead of “our” value system (Simmel 1950, 150–51; Stovel, Golub, and Milgrom 2011). This skepticism of the agent’s motives and the sense that he or she cannot be trusted may escalate to the point that the organizational network excludes the agent and he or she loses her group protection in the organization. Colleagues may report the agent’s corrupt deals with outsiders.

**Proposition 8:** In the case of social bribe, when the agent is deeply embedded in an outside social network, internal whistle-blowing, a bottom-up strategy, may be sparked by the suspicion of colleagues.
In many countries, informal institutions dominated by social bribe transactions persist because they function in providing solutions to serious problems rooted in society as a whole (Marquette and Peiffer 2018). Such informal networks are the result of historical patterns and serve as a survival kit to deal with the inadequacies of macro-level formal institutional arrangements such as shortages, insufficient rights, harsh uncertain environments, rigid authoritarian political regimes, or physical violence by authorities. The Latin American *compadrazgo*, Soviet and Russian *blat*, and Chinese *guanxi* are the best-known examples of such long-standing informal arrangements (Ledeneva 1998; Lomnitz 1988; Smart and Hsu 2008). These social problems are beyond the scope of conventional anticorruption policies and to remedy them, far-reaching social changes are needed.

**Proposition 9:** In the case of society-wide social bribe networks, any standard anticorruption solution may fail because social structures are resilient to such interventions.

**Corrupt Organizations**

The phenomenon of corrupt organizations is also referred to as corporate crime, illegal corporate behavior, elite deviance, or collective corruption (Albanese 1988; Palmer and Maher 2006; Pinto, Leana, and Pil 2008; Sherman 1980). Observing from the agent’s side, this is contracting corruption when bureaucrats control the allocation of licenses and contracts (Bussell 2015). In this type of corruption, a whole private organization acts as a client in a corrupt transaction. Although individuals may benefit from corrupt behavior on behalf of the organization in the form of promotion, bonuses, or pay increases, the organization is the primary and direct financial beneficiary of this type of corruption (Pinto, Leana, and Pil 2008; Wheeler and Rothman 1982). Corrupt organizations intend to achieve their legitimate goals by using illegal means (Palmer 2012, 47–52).

This corruption is also a trust-based reciprocal exchange, yet both parties in this “bureaucracy-to-bureaucracy” transaction exchange organizational resources instead of private or community resources (Graycar and Jancsics 2016). Formal organizations are especially keen to reduce environmental uncertainty and risk by developing interpersonal ties to other significant organizations (Schoormann, Bazerman, and Atkin 1981). Therefore, corrupt organizations will also prefer safer personal reciprocal exchanges over the riskier impersonal market corruption. Even the most basic form of corrupt organizations, kickbacks from a private enterprise for government contract, requires some level of trust between the partners because of the delay between the transfer (government decision) and countertransfer (kickback payment) or vice versa. It is not rare that trust comes first and partners who have already established legal business relations turn this into a corrupt deal (Lambsdorf and Teksoz 2004). Although the main function of this corruption on the client side is to obtain instrumental benefits for the organization, the form of the obtained resources is not necessarily financial. They can be nonmaterial, illegal benefits such as speeding up bureaucratic processes, getting permits and other approvals, or inhibiting competition. The case of a German banker whose bank obtained a construction permit and the right to buy a building site from the city as a favor from his city official friend and tennis partner is a good example of this type of corruption (Lambsdorf 2007, 217–18). In return, the bank gave the public official the option for buying a luxury mansion for a price significantly below market value.

The countertransfer from the private to the public organization may be financial (kickback, financing political parties, or heavily discounted shares in the company), but in many cases, it also has nonmaterial forms, such as lavish dinners, “conference trips” to attractive resorts, supportive media coverage, premium seating at sporting events, or gifts to the police retirement foundation. A good example of such nonmaterial bureaucratic gifts is the case of a former alderman of the Dutch city of Maastricht who accepted gifts valued at 42,000 Dutch guilders (about US$21,000) from three local companies in the form of household renovations (de Graaf 2007).

The corrupt organization phenomenon involves large numbers of employees and requires sophisticated internal coordination in the client organization and therefore can be viewed as collective corruption (Palmer and Maher 2006). The two main government mechanisms mentioned in the literature are organizational culture and power. Organizations are generally effective at transmitting and maintaining internal norms and developing stable organizational culture (Brashears, Genkin, and Suh 2017). Toxic cultures—particularistic informal norm systems that regulate the employees’ behavior—facilitate organizational-level corruption (Ashforth and Anand 2003; de Graaf 2007). Managers may be actively involved in corruption, but in many cases, they are simply unwilling to take corrective action against corruption (Daboub et al. 1995). They often nurture permissive ethical climates that make wrongdoing acceptable or even legitimate for other employees (Misangyi, Weaver, and Elms 2008). As the infamous Enron case showed, in corrupt organizations such cultures make even morally upstanding employees believe that competing firms are enemies that need to be defeated in order to secure the survival of their own company at any cost (Beenen and Pinto 2009; Campbell and Göritz 2014).

This corrupt organizational culture is somewhat different from the corrupt subculture of highly integrated workforces such as the “blue shield of silence” in police forces. While the first one is corruption that serves the whole private organization, which is the client of a corrupt transaction, the second, typical in market corruption, is organizationally harmful because corrupt agents steal or misuse resources of a public organization. Here the bribe giver client is outside the organization. The latter is rarely approved by top management, and this does not become part of the quasi-official culture.

A powerful informal norm in corrupt organizations is sanctioning the “deviant” noncorrupt actors who “betray” the organization (de Graaf 2007; Campbell and Göritz 2014). Even people who do not actively participate in corruption are reluctant to blow the whistle because they might face management retaliation, such as firing, being forced to retire, negative job performance evaluations, or blacklisting from getting another job in the field (Rothschild and Miethe 1999).

**Proposition 10:** In the case of corrupt organizations, internal whistle-blowing, a bottom-up strategy in the client organization, is viewed as betrayal and sanctioned by the organization.
The other mechanism for coordinating corruption in the organization is simply power, when superiors pressure their subordinates to obey authority and cover up for them (Needleman and Needleman 1979; Palmer and Maher 2006; Schef 1988; Trevino 1986). Corrupt organizations are top-down phenomena initiated and managed by corrupt executives (Pinto et al. 2008; Palmer and Maher 2006). This corruption aligns with the organization’s formal goals, which makes the organization “uninterested” in discovering it. The desire to please authority may lead employees to focus on carrying out instructions without even realizing the corrupt nature of their action (Prentice 2007).

As a result, corruption is treated as a normal part of everyday routines (Ashforth and Anand 2003). Various studies confirm that actors in corrupt dominant coalitions are powerful enough to evade internal organizational control mechanisms (Hudson and Garzón 2016; Jeppesen 2018; Yu, Rhodes, and Kang 2018). The infamous Goodrich brake scandal suggests that reports that warn for possible wrongdoing are easily ignored and manipulated by managers (Vandivier 1972). Executives use sophisticated techniques to make corruption invisible, such as coercing middle-level managers and professionals to manipulate documentation, falsifying reports, and hiding corrupt deals behind official processes (Javor and Jancsics 2016).

**Proposition 11:** In the case of corrupt organizations, internal top-down mechanisms in the client organization are evaded by corrupt organizational elites.

Although corrupt private organizations are relatively resilient against anticorruption, some policies implemented in the public organization on the agent’s side might be effective. A randomized controlled field experiment in 608 Indonesian villages showed that government monitoring reduces kickback-type corruption involving project officials and supply contractors (Ollken 2005). Other empirical research shows that intense government auditing in hospitals, especially together with higher public sector wages, can reduce the level of corruption between procurement officers and supplier firms (Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2003).

**Proposition 12:** In the case of corrupt organizations, external government monitoring and auditing in the agent’s organization can deter corruption.

There are several examples of investigative journalism exposing organizational corruption (Tombs 2013). Most of these cases attract significant media attention. Information disclosed to local communities about kickback-type corruption between municipalities and firms may reduce the incumbent’s likelihood of reelection (Avis, Ferraz, and Finan 2016). However, grassroots-type community participation in monitoring supplier firms has proven effective only when people came from inside the village where the project happened and personally stood to gain from reducing corruption (Ollken 2005).

**Proposition 13:** In the case of corrupt organizations, external bottom-up strategies such as a free press and citizen monitoring are potentially effective, especially when people are personally impacted by corruption.

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**State Capture**

In contrast to market and reciprocal exchanges, redistribution is a centralized form of resource transfer based on collection and allocation. Historically, redistribution has been related to a central administration ruled by a chief, despot, or lord (Polanyi 2001, 52). The redistributive form of corruption is state capture, also called kleptocracy, institutional or political corruption, or rule by thieves. In her typology, Bussell (2015) calls it legislative corruption. It often happens in developing or transitional societies, but resource-rich countries are also vulnerable to kleptocratic state capture (Cooley, Heathershaw, and Sharman 2018; Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2003). State capture refers to the process of capturing state regulatory authority. It occurs during the formation of rules and policy (input side) instead of through the implementation of established policy (output side), which is typical of other corruption types discussed earlier in this article. State capture creates a new macro-level, formal framework that benefits the captor group and protects its own corrupt conduct (Hellman and Kaufmann 2001).

The allocation of public resources, for example, in the form of procurement contracts, is based on formal rules; however, flows and loopholes are intentionally written in such a way that favors particularistic interest groups (Fazekas and Töth 2016). In its purest form, state capture is a national-level phenomenon, yet in its partial forms, political institutions at lower governmental levels (state, city, district, municipal) can also be captured by corrupt cliques (Jancsics 2017a).

Illicit privatization in Russia, the largest sell-off of state-owned property in history, in the early 1990s is a prime example of state capture (Monday 2017). Here oligarchs and powerful business entrepreneurs privatized former socialist enterprises by manipulating legislatures, courts, and law enforcement and created monopolistic empires in many economic sectors. The Russian government also granted cheap loans, tax exemptions, and other special privileges to them. Several African countries such as Congo, Guinea, and South Africa, where foreign multinational companies captured legislators to obtain exclusive mining licenses for natural resource extraction under government impunity, provide other examples of state capture (Mbaku 2018). Some scholars argue that massive lobbying by corporations to influence legislation in rich countries can be also viewed as a form of state capture. Such “gaming the system” subverts society’s universal rules for particularistic private gain without resorting to blatantly illegal acts (Salter 2010). For example, coal lobby groups in West Virginia in the United States financially supported legislators in return for relaxing environmental regulations. As a result, in 2014, the city of Charleston experienced a serious incident of chemical contamination of drinking water from nearby coal mines (Graycar and Monaghan 2015).

The main function of state capture is instrumental, financially benefiting a small elite clique and its clientele network. Although actors use formal organizations as instruments to channel public resources into private hands, the primary beneficiaries of this corruption are still individuals, oligarchs, and members of the corrupt political elite. State capture has two distinctive forms, “corporate state capture” and “party state capture” (Innes 2014). In the first version, oligarchs are the captors (clients) of state institutions, while in the second form, the separation between the politician (agent) and the businessmen (client) is more
difficult (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015, 34). Here the beneficiaries of the particularistic redistribution and the redistributors are both members of the same political elite. In the latter case, politicians use the state's power to channel public resources to private corporations, yet the same political actors benefit from the transactions by using hidden shell company structures and corruption brokers (Jancsics 2017b; Mihalyi and Szelenyi 2017; Cooley, Heathershaw, and Sharman 2018).

Two main mechanisms for coordinating the actor's behavior in captured systems are hierarchy and clan. Since corruption is hidden behind formal institutions, on the surface, hierarchical governance coordinates these activities (Powell 1990). This corruption is legal therefore actors do not do anything wrong, they just follow the (already tailored) formal rules (Kaufmann and Vicente 2011). Private organizations in captured systems are usually just shell companies, technical vehicles primarily used for carrying out the misallocation of public resources (Jancsics 2017b).

Proposition 14: In the case of state capture, organizational-level internal top-down anticorruption mechanisms do not officially recognize corruption because corruption is hidden in macro-level formal frameworks.

Since state capture is often the main guiding principle of a whole governance system, the corrupt elite needs mechanisms to ensure the collusion, cooperation, or obedience of large numbers of people and organizations. Therefore, captors have to use another informal coordination mechanism, clan control. In the case of social bribe, there is a normative coordination between more or less equal members of a horizontally structured informal network. In state capture, vertical network mechanisms coordinate the activity of unequal actors, superior patrons, and subordinate clients (Boissevain 1993; Muno 2013). Both are variants of clan control, personal and informal coordination mechanisms, but since in vertical structures, the lower-status individuals cannot reciprocate with favors, they have to balance the account with more intangible assets by providing loyalty and subordination to the person with superior status (Wolf 1966). A good example of such vertical networks is the case of Hungary, where the government, captured by a corrupt political clique, allocated thousands of tobacco retail concessions for a 20-year period to family members, friends, and even neighbors of local affiliates of the governing party (Jancsics 2017b).

In captured systems, checks on power are neutralized or co-opted (Walker and Aten 2018). External anticorruption mechanisms may exist on paper but are weakly implemented or simply not executed. For example, in the Czech Republic, the Conflict of Interest Law has existed since the early 1990s but has never applied to anyone below the level of minister or head of department (Innes 2014). The corrupt clique is also eager to capture and thus deactivate state institutions who have anticorruption functions. During the Jacob Zuma administration in South Africa, the corrupt elite took control over every key institution from the Financial Intelligence Centre to the Chief Procurement Office and even the National Treasury itself (Bracking 2018). Capturing elites are not always unified, but this does not necessarily help anticorruption. The struggle in the political arena often ends up with the politicization of external anticorruption instruments that are used to hunt down political opponents by accusing them of corruption (Meagher 2005). This suggests that anticorruption should be located outside the captured system at the international level.

Proposition 15: In the case of state capture, international conventions, as external top-down strategies, can pressure the corrupt elite for change.

State capture often happens in authoritarian regimes or illiberal democracies where elections are not fully free, fair, and competitive; therefore, elite change through democratic mechanisms is less likely. Captured institutions do not empower citizens to remove corrupt governments. In this case, public pressure, citizen mobilization, and social movements are often the only domestic tools against state capture. Here a coalition of all external bottom-up forces, civil society, the press, nongovernmental organizations, and even opposition political parties are desirable (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015, 173–74).

Proposition 16: In the case of state capture, external bottom-up strategies can pressure the corrupt elite for change.

Implications for Future Research and Practice

Although the academic research on corruption and policies to reduce it have proliferated over the last two decades, the lack of conceptual clarity is limiting the fight against corruption. In synthesizing recent developments and ideas from public administration and other disciplines, this article has introduced a new typology of corruption. This article proposed a resource-transfer-based conceptualization that considers various beneficiaries of corruption on the client side and covers major forms of corrupt activities. This typology reveals important social and organizational aspects of the phenomenon. The four cells of the typology indicate different forms of transferred resources, motivations, coordination mechanisms and functions, relationships between the actors, and strategies to keep corruption secret. The possible impacts of certain anticorruption tools on each corruption type were also discussed. The main goal was to help develop a better alignment between actual forms of corruption and policy responses.

This typology has some implications for scholarship. First, the typology provides conceptual clarity by offering two critical dimensions along which most corrupt behaviors occur: the resource transfer and the primary beneficiary. The use of these dimensions will help scholars better conceptualize corruption by distinguishing between different forms. It is hoped that this study contributes to clarify and revise the earlier corruption concepts in public administration.

Second, future studies can also further explore the role of clients. Previous public administration research focused predominantly on the role of public official in corruption, and accordingly, most anticorruption tools embraced the idea that interventions should influence the agent's behavior. Yet this typology suggests that clients are equally important actors in corrupt deals. There are different possible beneficiaries of corruption on the client's side, and their social and organizational contexts and relationship structures might affect the form of corruption and the success of anticorruption. In the case of social bribe, the agent often follows the norms of his or
her informal networks on the client’s side instead of formal rules that ideally should prevent corruption. Furthermore, in some cases the social bribe phenomenon might be just a symptom of a more serious problems within an entire society. Without understanding such social dynamics, effective anticorruption strategies against this particular form of corruption cannot be developed. In contrast, when the client of the corrupt transaction is a formal organization, very different factors influence the actors’ behavior. For example, here a toxic organizational culture pushes members to achieve organizational goals by using illicit tools and makes corruption entirely normal. Moreover, organizational elites often use power and threat to force employees to participate in corruption or cover up for them. Such organizational dynamics require anticorruption policies that are significantly different from those that are effective against social bribe.

Third, to set the stage for future empirical work, a testable theory was proposed with two main dimensions to differentiate between the major forms of corruption. Quantitative investigations could be undertaken to measure both dimensions. For example, survey items could be developed to ask respondents about their perception of different forms of resources transfers (market exchange, reciprocity, and redistribution) and the possible beneficiaries (individual, social group and organization) of corruption. A more bottom-up empirical investigation could also identify these corruption types in existing corrupt cases. Here the cases should be coded by using the main dimensions and the elements introduced in this article as qualitative codes. Moreover, propositions were formulated concerning how each corruption type could be fought. From these propositions, testable hypotheses could be derived.

The typology also has implications for practice. It provides policy makers with a tool to strengthen decision making about corruption. Most importantly, practitioners need to be aware of the nature of corruption they face. The general policy implication of this article is that anticorruption policies must be corruption-type specific and distinguish among variations in corruption. It means that anticorruption policies must shift from one-size-fits-all solutions, often proposed by international organizations such as Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other nongovernmental organizations, to strategies tailored to actual types of corruption. Empirical research has already confirmed that anticorruption tools can be effective if they focus on actual cases in which corruption may happen. In order to detect the type of corruption, policy makers should go closer to the phenomenon and understand the operations of particular offices, departments, agencies, local governments, public projects, or procurement regimes.

It is also important to identify the level where a specific type of corruption is most visible and detectable. This typology crosses various levels of analysis (micro, meso, and macro). Market corruption is a one-time transaction typically involving street-level bureaucrats and can be captured in micro-level social interactions. Social bribe is a recurring activity using resources typically from the middle level of the organization and spreading over family, friendship, or local community networks. This phenomenon requires analysis that simultaneously considers the organizational and social contexts of the participants. The corrupt organizations type refers to cases with collusion between multiple members within hierarchies of large organizations. This indicates a meso-level perspective to reveal and understand intraorganizational dynamics. State capture is a systemic form of corruption involving government elites, legislators, and powerful economic actors who redistribute significantly more resources than exchanged in the first three types. Here, a macro-level focus on political institutions and interorganizational structures is required.

Corruption will stay with us for a long time. It is crucial that researchers and practitioners develop better ways to study and explain its major forms. If we fail to achieve a better understanding of this complex phenomenon, significant resources will continue to be invested in anticorruption reforms that are not effective, and citizens’ trust in government will further decline globally.

References
Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis


